We know already that several psychological and sociological studies have shown that discriminatory attitudes (and beliefs) tend to covary. To prove, however, that the correlations hold for all types of discrimination, or infrafactorial exclusivism, it is not only the conceptual apparatus of a complete classification system of exclusivisms which is required. Even with such an instrument available, the conclusive proof will have to wait until the first society can be studied which has been free from any exclusivism for a number of generations. Can we wait that long? The answer is No, we cannot, because it is precisely by waiting for such an inclusive society to come that it would never emerge. Strictly speaking, we do not need any empirical presuppositions with regard to correlations between exclusivist attitudes and practises, and we shall not pretend that we know that such correlations exist in the ground-world. (However, ground-world correlations in general must be distinguished from the impact of exclusivist ideology itself.) Nonetheless, if the assumption is correct, it means that a particular belief, attitude or practise which should be displayed according to some doctrinal principle (the norm of inclusivity in our case), cannot be displayed, to a certain extent, when it is demanded in combination with (too many) exclusivist beliefs, attitudes and practises. Thus if (infrafactorial) exclusivisms do covary strongly, every ideology or normative doctrine which propagates a nonexclusivist ideal, but which simultaneously is founded on a multitude of exclusivist elements of belief, is doomed to failure as far as that ideal is concerned (but unfortunately, not necessarily in other respects). This, in turn, may explain why quite a few 'universal ideals' have never been realized even after millenniums of one exclusivist ideology's hegemony over large parts of the world. It is therefore very worthwhile to take a closer look at the plausibility of the assumption that the different kinds of infrafactorial exclusivism do indeed lend each other support. We shall first do this by discussing a number of imaginary, yet quite realistic, cases.

To start with, let us consider a group of people of one race who believe that their own race is an intelligent one, altho other races may be more musical. They also believe in a supreme being which has (once) exclusively revealed itself in the person of somebody of their own race. What is, then, the chance that these people at the same time are of the opinion that anybody of any race should be eligible for any job or office, for example, that of the president of the country? If the people in question show a consistent pattern of sentiments and opinions, the chance is nil. Because of the fact that they find members of other races perhaps musical but not intelligent, they will not expect anyone of a different race to be intelligent enough for a position of authority. Because of the fact that they believe that the supreme being exclusively revealed itself in a person of their own race, they will readily associate their own race with supremeness and supremacy (if not consciously, then subconsciously) and they will be of the opinion that superior tasks should be assigned to superior people, namely members of their own race. The chance that the persons in question are for racial equality in the occupational field, not only formally but also in practise, while accepting all its consequences, may be expected to be much smaller than in the case of people who do not have the ideas mentioned (because their ideas are inclusive or less exclusive). In the exclusivist belief of the former group there always remains one office which definitely never was held, and definitely never will be held, by somebody of a different race: the office of the supreme being or its purported (onetime) representative on Earth.

Let us now consider a man who thinks that physical beauty only concerns women, or women and girls; that it is their task to cook, to wash and to make everything look nice, including their own bodies; he does not feel that males are ugly, but he believes that boys and certainly men cannot (or should not) distinguish themselves, or be distinguished, on the basis of their physical appearance (other than the criterion that they should not look 'feminine'). Let us assume that this man also believes in a supreme being which has the characteristics of a male person, of a 'father' who rules the family of 'mankind', and that 'He' has exclusively manifested 'Himself' or has manifested 'Himself' exclusively in one living person, namely a male human being on the planet Earth ('His son' or 'last prophet'). What is the chance that he at the same time is of the opinion that every man and every woman should be able to occupy any post he or she is qualified for, such as the highest position in his religious organization? Again, if this person shows a consistent pattern of sentiments and opinions, the chance is nil. Since he judges women by their beauty (or ugliness) and not by their technical or intellectual skills, he will easily attribute a lack of technical and intellectual ability to them, and he would not like to see them in high positions accordingly. And since he refers to the supreme being as "He", attributing to 'Him' all the characteristics of a male person, he will easily associate his own sex with supremeness and supremacy (if not consciously, then subconsciously) and he will be of the opinion that superior jobs or positions should be given to superior people, namely men. And again, the chance that this person shows no consistent pattern of sentiments and opinions, that is, that he is for sexual equality in the field of jobs and positions, may be expected to be much smaller than in the case of someone who does not have the ideas mentioned. In the man's exclusivist belief there remains always one office which definitely never was held, and definitely never will be held, by a woman: the office of the supreme being or 'His' purported representative on Earth.

The question of correlation does not only play a role with respect to thoughts, feelings and tendencies in the same field, it also plays a role with respect to thoughts, feelings and tendencies in different fields. Consider, for example, a person who believes that the office of head of state should be held by someone who(se body) is the (male) child of the previous head of state (somebody of 'er own race), and that certain other people should be granted an (upper-class) state income on the basis of their being related to the present or previous head of state. Let us assume that this person also feels that complete nudity is indecent, that certain (so-called 'private') parts of the body should always remain hidden in the presence of other people or bodies, except, perhaps, for a spouse and for pressing (other) medical reasons. Let us further assume that this same person has a great influence on the building of new homes in the town or city where 'e lives, and that 'e uses this influence to build family homes only, that is, homes for married couples with children, altho many (if not most) households do not consist of one male adult, one female adult married to him and one or more children. What is the chance that this person is of the opinion that anyone of any race should be able to get any job 'e is qualified for? Altho the question of racial equality lies in another field than that of family membership, nudity and the composition of households, the chance is still nil if the person considered shows a consistent pattern of sentiments and opinions. Because of the fact that this person believes that certain offices ought to be held, and certain incomes ought to be received, on the basis of relationship only, the belief that offices ought to be held, or for that matter, not to be held, on the basis of race only agrees with this. Not being able to look objectively at the phenomenon of nudity, and being subject to purely emotional reactions of inhibition and fear, 'e would similarly show a purely emotional reaction of insecurity when confronted with people of another race in a high position. And as this person has no interest in people who live alone or together in households of a different composition than (what presumably is, was or will be) 'er own, 'e will have a lesser interest in people who live alone or together in households of a different race than 'er own, and more generally, in people of a different race than 'er own. 'E will not find other races (or a particular other race) as interesting and likable as 'er own race, nor will 'e assign an equal importance to other races, and accordingly 'e will be of the opinion that at least certain exclusive positions (such as that of the head of state) should remain the privilege of 'er own race.

The chance that the person focused on in this third example will not show a consistent pattern, and that 'e will not have racist opinions, sentiments or tendencies in any way, will be smaller than the chance that 'e does have them, unless this pattern is or has been upset by interfactorially exclusivistic effects. For example, if it is taboo in the community in which the person lives to be a racist, or to openly display racism in ground-world conduct, whereas it is not taboo to defend monarchism, to be a prudist and to discriminate between households on the basis of their composition, then it is obvious that the correlation in such a community between racism and the three other infrafactorial exclusivisms may be weaker or even absent. But it is, then, weaker because it is counteracted by a force especially exerted to mitigate or offset the ill effects of a particular form of discrimination (say, when racism is not merely taboo, but when exclusive antiracism has even become a fashion). As soon as that force is not strong enough anymore, or as soon as it has to be divided over too many fields in order to counteract not just one but several infrafactorial exclusivisms, the discriminatory beliefs and practises which once seemed to have been quelled will reemerge. It is not until that moment that correlations between exclusivisms in entirely different fields may indeed turn out to exist, even tho they are (temporarily) absent because of an interfactorially exclusivistic counterforce.

In theory the possible combinations of beliefs, feelings and tendencies a person can have, and of the things 'e can do, are innumerable. But each thought, feeling, tendency or action is either exclusive or nonexclusive, however unrelated the fields they belong to may seemingly be. And if there is indeed a strong correlation between exclusivist beliefs, feelings, tendencies and actions on the one hand, and inclusivistic beliefs, feelings, tendencies and actions on the other, there are not only structurally but also in practise two basic combinations. They are: the combination of all the former beliefs, attitudinal components and actions which reflect the exclusive attitude; and the combination of all the latter beliefs, attitudinal components and actions which reflect the inclusive attitude. Between these two principal atitudes there is a fundamental divide. More or less consistently people exhibit either the one or the other attitude in the things they believe in, and in the way they feel and act. To the extent in which feelings and thoughts about the world around them show a pattern of consistence (an either inclusive or exclusive one) we cannot divorce the way people deal with one facet of life from the way they deal with other facets of life. Certain exclusive beliefs or feelings which seem harmless on their own may in fact be correlated with other exclusive beliefs or feelings which have a pernicious influence on the attainment of cardinal inclusive ideals. All exclusive beliefs, thoughts, feelings, tendencies and actions, however harmless at first appearance, do reflect one of the two principal attitudes: the exclusive attitude.

When an ideology is exclusivistic, it contains exclusivist factual, modal and/or normative beliefs or thoughts; it arouses or exploits exclusivist feelings; it creates or depends on exclusivist tendencies; and/or it incites people to act in an exclusivist manner, either by exclusion or by exclusivity. Exclusivist ideologies are the product of exclusive attitudes but once having established themselves, they perpetuate these very attitudes (which by then can correctly be called "exclusivistic"). Altho 'exclusivism' as an explicit ideology in itself does not exist (yet), it is a way of thinking, feeling and acting which has had, and still has, an enormous impact on all aspects of human and nonhuman life, not only in its active, infrafactorial form of discrimination, but also in its interfactorial and passive forms. The absence of exclusivism as an ideology in which the violation of the norm of inclusivity would be an end in itself has been 'most generously made up for' by religious, theodemonical, political and other ideologies or traditions with out-and-out exclusivistic contents and records.